University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Faculty Scholarship

Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty

2021

Contract's Influence on Feminism and Vice Versa
Martha M. Ertman
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, mertman@law.umaryland.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Contracts Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the
Sexuality and the Law Commons

Digital Commons Citation
Ertman, Martha M., "Contract's Influence on Feminism and Vice Versa" (2021). Faculty Scholarship. 1653.
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/1653

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty at
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Contract’s Influence on Feminism and Vice Versa
Martha M. Ertman
University of Maryland Carey Law School
mertman@law.umaryland.edu
This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University
Press in The Oxford Handbook of Feminism and Law in the U.S. (ed. Debora Brake, Martha
Chamallas & Verna Williams 2022)
Abstract
Feminist legal theory has both embraced and rejected contract . While contract-based
conceptual and doctrinal tools have improved women’s economic and social status , feminists
also critique contract-based reforms for colluding with hierarchies of gender, race and class.
This chapter charts influential work on both sides of the contract debate and identifies a third
approach that sees contract as a mechanism for law to move away from a hierarchal regime by
stopping at a contractual way station en route to a more equal system of public ordering. It
concludes by identifying ways that feminist legal theorists have injected feminist insights into
traditional contract law via doctrines such as good faith in employment contracts, debtor rights in
lending relationships, and defenses including unconscionability and duress.
Keywords
contract, feminism, legal theory, prenuptial agreements, postnuptial agreements, cohabitation,
marriage, homemaking labor, reproductive technologies, gender and debt

Feminist legal theory and contract theory have a long and complex relationship. On the
upside, conceptual and doctrinal tools imported from contract have upgraded women’s status
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from doormats to fuller citizenship, especially in families. But a number of feminists express
concern that contract-based reforms do less good than the procontract camp acknowledges, and
indeed inflict harm.
This tension between pro- and anticontract views likewise appears in the more abstract
discussions of legal, social, and economic hierarchies. Political theorists and philosophers have
long hypothesized that a mythical social contract established the civil state. Traditional social
contract theory justifies law—state power over individuals—on the grounds that the regulated
individuals were party to these hypothetical contract negotiations that gave the state the power to
make and enforce laws in exchange for people’s health, safety, and welfare. Feminist theorist
Carole Pateman’s highly influential 1988 book challenged this conventional wisdom. She argued
that the social contract only masquerades as a deal made by everyone, for everyone, when it
actually constitutes and continues to justify patriarchal rule of men over women.1
Philosopher Charles Mills extended Pateman’s analysis of the social contract’s faux
neutrality to encompass race, arguing that the social contract actually created and sustains white
supremacy.2 His logic, however, leads to a different destination, one that sees contractual
thinking as a vehicle for reform and reparations. Where Pateman and others would scrap the
whole social contract metaphor—and presumably reforms that rest on contract—Mills would
retain contract’s liberal promise of equal opportunity for all. He built a compelling case for

1
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reparations for people of color who have been and continue to be systemically harmed by racial
breaches of the social contract.
The combination of Pateman’s distrust of contractual rhetoric and Mills’s embrace of its
progressive potential reflects the range of feminist positions regarding contract. Feminists have
voiced both enthusiasm and serious concerns about contracts in, for example, marital and
reproductive technology contracts. This chapter echoes that focus on family law since many
contract-related reforms seek to improve women’s economic and other interests in adult
relationships and parenthood.3
First- and second-wave feminists used contract as a tool to remedy the status-based
strictures grounded in gender that define traditional marriage. Status-based rules of coverture
deprived wives of the right to enter contracts, enjoy an equal share of household wealth
accumulation, and say “no” to their husbands’ sexual advances. Feminist reforms to remedy
those injustices included Married Women’s Property Acts in the nineteenth century, repeal of the
marital rape exception in the 1970s, and today’s continuing struggles to gain adequate respect

3

Contracts and not legally binding exchanges in the intimate sphere pack a strong gender punch.

LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS AND THE LAW (1981);
LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD,
THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING FAMILIES AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989); Hila Keren,
Feminism and Contract Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 406 (Robin
West & Cynthia Grant Bowman eds., 2019).
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and pay for housework and other care work. Another feminist reform based on contractual
thinking is the still-evolving advocacy for law to recognize alternatives to marriage such as
cohabitation and expand ways to relinquish and attain legal parenthood via reproductive
technologies and adoption. These feminists note that contract can reflect how families actually
function, in contrast to status-based notions that designate only one type of family as “real” or
“natural”—a heterosexual married couple raising kids to whom they are genetically related.
In contrast, anticontract feminists flag the dangers of gender, race, and class
subordination in contract-based reforms. For example, attempts to protect wives in prenuptial
agreements overlook lower rates of marriage among African-American women, race-related
patterns of wealth accumulation that make prenups more likely in marriages of white people, that
many if not most divorcing couples have more debts than property to divide, and continuing
power disparities between spouses.4 Likewise, contract skeptics see reproductive technology
contracts as protecting white, propertied motherhood while courting eugenics and commodifying
children.5
This chapter charts influential work on both sides of the contract debate and identifies a
third approach that sees contract as a mechanism for law to move away from a hierarchal regime

4

RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? (2011); DOROTHY ROBERTS,

KILLING THE BLACK BODY (1997); Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in
the Search for Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481 (1994); CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED
COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2010).
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by stopping at a contractual way station en route to a more equal system of public ordering.6 One
example of such an innovation is known as collaborative family law, in which disputing couples
essentially contract out of using traditional litigation-focused dispute resolution and into a system
that honors the role of emotions and integrates social workers or other therapists into dispute
resolution.7
The first section of this chapter sets out examples of feminist theory that portray contract
as a route to gender equality. Section II discusses feminist scholarship that cautions against
colluding with gender subordination. Section III introduces the view of contract as a private law
laboratory of sorts to try out new forms of relation that can mature to public law rules that
recognize gender equality. Finally, section IV identifies ways that feminist legal theorists have
injected feminist insights into traditional contract law via doctrines such as good faith in
employment contracts, debtor rights in lending relationships, and defenses such as
unconscionability and duress.

I.

Contacts as Instruments of Gender Equality

Some feminists disagree with poet and essayist Audre Lorde that “the master’s tools will never
dismantle the master’s house.”8 They point to the crucial role that contract played in dismantling
foundational elements of the patriarchal master’s house by chipping away at coverture’s refusal

6

See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443.

7

See, e.g., JANE C. MURPHY & JANA B. SINGER, DIVORCED FROM REALITY: RETHINKING FAMILY

DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2015).
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to recognize women’s independent legal identities. Those modifications to the marriage contract
allowed law to finally recognize and remedy intimate partner violence, marital rape, and
women’s economic subordination.9 In addition, the framework of contract paved the way for law
to expand the definition of family beyond marriage to include cohabitation, polyamory, living-

9

See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF.

L. REV. 1373 (2000); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2147 (1996);Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status
Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1243 (1998);
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 204, 211 (1982); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the
Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001); Barbara A. Atwood, Marital
Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 11 (2012).
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apart-together, and relations of dependency,10 and also to recognize a range of parent-child
relationships made possible by reproductive technologies.11

10

BOWMAN, supra note 4; NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:

VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits,
106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007); Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default
Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010); Martha M. Ertman, Race
Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 291,
334–338 (2010); William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881 (2012); Cynthia Grant Bowman,
Living Apart Together, Women, and Family Law, 24 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 47
(2017); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55 (2016); JUDITH STACEY,
UNHITCHED: LOVE, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY VALUES FROM WEST HOLLYWOOD TO WESTERN
CHINA 151 (2011); GILLIAN CALDER & LORI G. BEAMAN, POLYGAMY’S RIGHTS AND WRONGS:
PERSPECTIVES ON HARM, FAMILY, AND LAW (2014); Melissa Murray, Accommodating
Nonmarriage, 88 S. CALIF. L. REV. 661 (2015;MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
11

See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:

An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297; Courtney Meghan Cahill,
Reproduction Reconceived, 101 MINN. L. REV. 617 (2016); April L. Cherry, Choosing
Substantive Justice: A Discussion of “Choice,” “Rights” and the New Reproductive
Technologies, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 431 (1997); Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88
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A.

Contract as an Upgrade from Status

One benefit of a contractual framework is that it presupposes the possibility of modification.
Thus, family law can change, evolving to recognize new family forms such as same-sex
marriages and nonmarital cohabitation. Cohabitation and other alternative family forms often
take shape via contracts, such as living-together, surrogacy, and sperm donation agreements.
Status is the alternative to a range of legally recognized families structured by contracts and legal
rules that reflect their particular situations. A status-based view of family asserts that God or
biology has designated only one form of family as natural and worthy of legal protection and
social respect—married, heterosexual couples, raising genetically related kids.
Many feminist legal reforms have prompted a shift away from status and toward contract.
For example, the nineteenth-century Married Women’s Property Acts displaced elements of
common-law coverture rules and gave wives the power to make contracts and own property.
Along the same lines, the 1866 Civil Rights Act provided—and still provides—that “[a]ll
persons . . . have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white

N.C. L. REV. 1739 (2010); Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism, 30 BERKELEY J.
GENDER, L. & JUST. 22 (2015); Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375
(1996); Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1177 (2010); BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE
NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010).
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citizens.”12 Yet even contract enthusiasts acknowledge that contract was hardly a silver bullet
that eradicated race and gender subordination. As historian Amy Dru Stanley pointed out
regarding the nineteenth-century Married Women’s Property Acts, wives of all races had the
right to their own labor and person, yet the reforms left intact a husband’s legal title to his wife’s
service at home.13 Along the same lines the post-Reconstruction South reinstated debt peonage
and sharecropping systems—within larger Jim Crow limits on African Americans’ participation
in civil and economic life—that mimicked enslavement in many respects.14 Still, the turn to
contract and away from status has revamped the strictures of marriage.

B.

Marriage and Beyond

Marriage has long been a mix of status and contract, in different proportions at different times
and contexts. Even the status-focused coverture framework presupposed that a woman entered a
civil contract by which she subsumed her legal identity under that of her husband. Gradually,
reforms eroded much of the status elements of the marriage contract to make it more of a
formally equal partnership. Those modifications contributed to legal recognition of sexual assault
within marriage and intimate partner violence more generally, as well as proposals to better
value homemaking labor.

12

42 U.S.C. § 1981; AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,

MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998).
13

STANLEY, supra note 12, at 175.

14

ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1988); Guyora Binder,

The Slavery of Emancipation, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2063 (1996).
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Contract requires genuine consent, and conversely rape involves the lack of consent.
Catharine MacKinnon, in her signature brand of take-no-prisoners prose, excoriated the law for
treating “[u]nvirtuous women, like wives and prostitutes, [as] consenting, whores, unrapable.”15
The myth that marriage vows constituted a blanket consent every time the husband sought sex
fell under this feminist challenge. By the late twentieth century, men no longer could rape their
wives with impunity, though the punishments for rape often treat rape within marriage as less
serious than stranger rape.16
Contracts also feature prominently in feminist legal theory addressing the persistent
devaluation of homemaking labor and other care work.17 The wages-for-housework movement
dates back to the first wave of feminism,18 but its modern incarnation came out of socialist
feminists’ engagement in Marxist thought. Advocacy and academic discourse coalesced in

15

CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 175 (1989)

(emphasis added).
16

See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 9; LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2012).
17

Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65

(1998); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work
through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998); MARTHA M. ERTMAN,
LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL & INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES
(2015)[hereinafter ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES].
18

See, e.g., CICELY HAMILTON, MARRIAGE AS A TRADE (1912).
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movements such as the 1970s International Wages for Housework Campaign and a Global
Women’s Strike in 2000, which aimed to show the value of caregiving work by going a day
without it.19 “Wages for housework” became a rallying cry that morphed into an avalanche of
law review articles seeking to commodify homemaking labor through a theory justifying alimony
as a payment to which divorced wives were entitled instead of charity that terminated when a
woman remarried.20
Legal reforms altered not just the terms of the marital contract but also the outdated
status-based limits on who can marry. Landmark cases that allowed interracial and same-sex

19

SILVIA FEDERICI, WAGES FOR HOUSEWORK (2d ed. 2017); SELMA JAMES & MARIA DALLA

COSTA, THE POWER OF WOMEN AND THE SUBVERSION OF COMMUNITY (1972); SELMA JAMES,
WOMEN, THE UNIONS AND WORK: OR WHAT IS NOT TO BE DONE (1972); GLOBAL WOMEN’S
STRIKE, https://globalwomenstrike.net/2000/03 (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
20

Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls,

Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993); Ann
Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV.
721 (1993); Joan C. Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO.
L.J. 2227 (1994); Jana B. Singer, Alimony & Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the
Economic Justification of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994); Katharine B. Silbaugh,
Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997); Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage, supra note 17.
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couples to marry dramatically modified the marriage contract.21 A crucial step in extending
marriage equality to same-sex couples occurred when law and culture first recognized that a
heterosexual couple living together outside of marriage were not criminals and thus entitled to
enter into cohabitation contracts.
Living together has increased over 1000 percent since 1960. Fully 10 percent of
American households included a cohabiting couple as of the 2010 Census, and by 2019 more
Americans ages eighteen to forty-four had lived together than had been married.22
Prior to the mid-1970s, the law refused to recognize cohabitation agreements, labeling
them “meretricious,” or akin to prostitution. A California case changed that view. In the mid1960s, actor Lee Marvin and aspiring singer Michelle Triola moved in together. Michelle took
his name, as many cohabiting women do. They agreed that he would support her for life in
exchange for her giving up her singing career to become his full-time “companion, homemaker,

21

Legitimizing interracial marriage required a century of struggle, culminating with Loving v.

Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Marriage equality for same sex couples followed a few decades
later, first in reforms to state law, then in federal cases that worked their way up to the U.S.
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003);
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
22

ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES, supra note 17, at 118; Nikki Graf, Key Findings on Marriage and

Cohabitation in the U.S., FACT TANK (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/11/06/key-findings-on-marriage-and-cohabitation-in-the-u-s/.
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housekeeper, and cook.”23 After they split up, Michelle sued for breach of contract. In 1976, the
California Supreme Court recognized her right—and other cohabitants—to sue for breach of this
contract. That decision brought the term “palimony” into popular speech, or “galimony” when
the cohabitants were both women. This new terminology helped family law and the public see
cohabitation as an alternative to marriage instead of a crime. Other states quickly followed suit
and today, live-ins can contract with each other nearly everywhere in the United States, though
they often have to also satisfy procedural requirements such as getting the agreement in
writing.24
Marvin played a key role in the LGBT rights movement’s progress toward marriage
equality and other legal rights. Between the 1970s and 2000, same-sex couples increasingly used
contracts such as cohabitation agreements, wills, and powers of attorney to make the law at least
partly recognize that they saw themselves as family. By the 1990s, domestic partnership
employment policies in employment contracts and some municipalities, which gave couples

23

Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).

24

Despite the utility of these agreements, most unmarried couples do not enter them. For an

analysis of that phenomenon, see, e.g., Helen Reece, Leaping without Looking, in ROBERT
LECKEY, AFTER LEGAL EQUALITY: FAMILY, SEX, KINSHIP 115 (2015).
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more recognition and a measure of protection, further paved the way for same-sex couples to
enjoy marriage equality.25
This expansion of contract within family law led scholars in the 1990s and early twentyfirst century to debate whether the law ought to go all the way, abolishing civil marriage and
replacing it with contracts.26 Martha Fineman was among the first feminists to champion contract
as an improvement over status-based understandings of adult relationships, finding it “a useful
tool with which to examine family relationships—relationships that have their roots in the more
ancient realms of status and hierarchy.”27 Fineman touted the value of giving individuals “the
means to voluntarily and willingly assume obligations and gain entitlements,” so as to bring
stability to relationships while remaining open to the potential for change.28 Fineman’s highly
influential body of work—and that of the many scholars who follow her lead—seeks to redefine

25

Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell

Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107 (1996); Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering
for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1235 (2010).
26

See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 10; MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, JUST MARRIAGE (Joshua Cohen

& Deborah Chasman eds., 2004); KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE
EQUALITY (2015); POLIKOFF, supra note 10; Summer L. Nastich, Questioning the Marriage
Assumptions: The Justifications for “Opposite-Sex Only” Marriage as Support for the Abolition
of Marriage, 21 LAW & INEQ. 114 (2003).
27

Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1408 (2001).

28

Id.
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“family” as parent-child and other relationships of dependency and vulnerability, instead of the
current definition that centers on a sexual dyad in marriage. The core problem with having
marriage define family, for Fineman, was that it privatizes responsibility for care and its costs.
Fineman would instead demote marriage to a private, perhaps religious status and “collapse all
sexual relationships into the same category-private-not sanctioned, privileged, or preferred by
law.”29 Law would instead provide rights and responsibilities to support the inevitable
dependency of children and others requiring care, and the derivative dependency of the
caregivers (often mothers).
But not all feminists agreed with Fineman’s push to replace marriage with contract. Anita
Bernstein predicted that an explicit transition from status to contract would mean that
All domestic relations between adult individuals would be formed by issuespecific agreements. Family law would survive in order to regulate the care of
children, but two would no longer become one in any legal sense. The law would
intervene in a couple’s life just as it now uses the law of contracts, torts, crimes,
and property to moderate relations between any other adults.30
Bernstein concluded that abolishing marriage-as-a-status would do more harm than good, since
the role played by marriage would be replaced by “either the state or capital, an unrelenting press

29

FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 5.

30

Anita Bernstein, For and against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 135 (2003).
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of the market.”31 With “[n]o blithe, freeing, choice-affirming alternative to this extraordinary
institution . . . available,” she concluded that marriage should be mended, not ended.32

C.

Expanding Parent-Child Relationships

Contracts also played a crucial role in creating and supporting families beyond the traditional
mold of one man and one woman and their biological children. The law and a multi-billiondollar reproductive technology sector allow gamete “donors” to contract out of legal parenthood
when they sell their eggs or sperm to an egg or sperm bank, making room for “intended parents”
who can step in as the legal parents of children born through alternative insemination or
surrogacy. This reproductive labor provides new ways for women to earn money in work they
deem fulfilling.33 Increasingly, law recognizes three-parent families, such as a lesbian couple that
contracts with a gay man for him to provide the sperm and all three of them to be legal parents.34

31

Id. at 212.

32

Id.

33

HEATHER JACOBSON, LABOR OF LOVE: GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AND THE WORK OF MAKING

BABIES (2016); JOSHUA GAMSON, MODERN FAMILIES: STORIES OF EXTRAORDINARY JOURNEYS
TO KINSHIP

(2015); RENE ALMELING, SEX CELLS: THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM

(2011). Works documenting and critiquing dehumanizing and exploitative elements of this work
include JULIA DEREK, CONFESSIONS OF A SERIAL EGG DONOR (2004), and RADIN, supra note 5, at
150.
34

See ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 45–66.

California and the District of Columbia allow a man who is the genetic father of a child to
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So many gay men, lesbians, and single women became parents via this route that it’s jokingly
called a “gayby boom.”35
One prominent case served as a pivot point. In 1988, the New Jersey Supreme Court case
Baby M refused to enforce a surrogacy contract on the grounds that it violated public policy and
perhaps even state law criminalizing baby selling.36 That opinion—and the worldwide press
coverage of the case—unleashed a deluge of debate about evolving methods of family formation
and whether contracts—and contractual thinking—were good for women, children, and society
more broadly. New Jersey’s Supreme Court declared that “there are, in a civilized society, some
things that money can’t buy.”37 Yet the court used family law doctrine to achieve much of what

contractually agree to be the third legal parent along with a lesbian couple. CAL. FAM. CODE §
7613(b)(2012); D.C. CODE § 16-909 (2009). Progressive developments have also moved from
contract to status. For example, until the 1970s, a man was a legal stranger to children born out
of wedlock and had no duty to support them. Paula A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and PostDeath Parentage: A Different Path for Inheritance Law? 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 860–
861 (2008).
35

Tosca Langbert, The Gayby Boom Is Here to Stay, HARV. POL. REV. (Feb. 14, 2020),

https://harvardpolitics.com/the-gayby-boom/.
36

In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).

37

Id. at 1249.
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the surrogacy contract contemplated: the intended parents had legal custody of the child, and the
genetic mother and surrogate was allowed occasional visits.38
Just five years later, the California Supreme Court opened the golden state’s doors to the
reproductive technology industry via Johnson v. Calvert, which validated a surrogacy contract
that differed from the one in Baby M in one crucial aspect.39 By the 1990s, advances in in vitro
fertilization (IVF) allowed a surrogate to bear a child to whom she had no genetic relationship
because the egg was provided by another woman. The sperm typically came from the intended
father. IVF, in short, enabled intentional parents and surrogates to “contract around” the legal
and ethical specter of surrogate mothers relinquishing children to whom they are genetically
related. Today more than nine of ten surrogacies are gestational, a method that, as of 2014,
brought more than 1,600 children into the world each year.40
While California’s willingness to enforce gestational surrogacy contracts made that state
the center of the multi-billion-dollar reproductive technologies industry, other states also enforce
commercial surrogacy agreements, though some others ban or sharply curtail the terms of those

38
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(Douglas G. Baird ed., Foundation Press 2007).
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agreements. Liberal feminists whose work has supported that recognition include Marjorie
McGuire Shultz and Carmen Shalev.41

II.

Contract as an Instrument of Gender Subordination

Some feminists contend that contract is an unsuitable tool to dismantle the master’s house. These
scholars highlight how neoliberal principles radiating from the ideal of “freedom of contract”
ignore that many people lack the socioeconomic resources to get to the bargaining table.42

A.

Limited Benefit of Modified Marriage Contract

Scholars such as Robin Lenhardt and Nancy Polikoff warn against using marriage reform to
serve feminist ends because marriage has long benefited white, middle-class Americans more
than everyone else.43 Most of this literature aims for intersectionality, with some scholars
focusing more on racial inequalities and others seeing marriage as hopelessly heteropatriarchal
and thus antithetical to feminist and LGBTQ interests.
For much of U.S. history, enslaved people were legally banned from marrying, and the
post-Civil War expansion of marriage equality that purported to be part of the freed-people’s
newly equal status failed to deliver on that promise. Instead, in Lenhardt’s words, “marriage

41

Shultz, supra note 11; CARMEN SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1991).

42
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(2002).
43
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regulation—not unlike Jim Crow segregation in public schools or housing—has been
instrumental in locking African America into a second-class citizenship from which it has not yet
fully emerged.”44 For example, extravagant government support for families such as the GI Bill
and Social Security largely denied African Americans that social and economic capital. Instead
of a new deal, African Americans were subjected to the same old deal via welfare regulations
predicated on purported failures of personal responsibility that disrupted relationships,
compromised autonomy, and exacerbated racial disadvantage and stigma.45
Today, marriage continues to benefit haves more than have-nots. White Americans are
much more likely to marry than African Americans, and college graduates are more likely to
marry than those with less education and thus more modest socioeconomic resources.46 Those
data, coupled with declining marriage rates across demographic groups, strengthen contractskeptics’ contention that we should abandon the marriage contract altogether.47
Nancy Polikoff’s book Beyond (Gay and Straight) Marriage made perhaps the most
comprehensive case for moving beyond conjugality. Where Martha Fineman focused on fragile
economic circumstances of dependents and those who care for them, Polikoff would also

44

Lenhardt, supra note 43, at 1319; see also FRANKE, supra note 26.

45
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recognize as “family” sexual adult relationships. She proposed a postconjugal legal regime in
which law allocates rights and duties based on how intimate relationships function, whether they
are between adults, caretaking relationships, between adults and children, or adult dependents.
Instead of requiring marriage to trigger a person’s rights and duties, Polikoff would use
households or a similar reflection of who functions as a person’s family.48

B.

Dangers of Contractual Parenthood

Feminists also flag dangers in contracting for parenthood through surrogacy and other
reproductive technologies, raising objections about limited access and market-inflicted harms.
Regarding access, Libby Adler pointed out that these methods of family formation require
advance planning, which “may be a class-based, racially, and regionally selective luxury.”49
Procedures can also be expensive, particularly surrogacy, in which intended parents pay as much
as $150,000 - $200,000 to bring genetically related children into their families.50
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The market is structured for white, middle-class women to access reproductive
technologies, instead of facilitating access for everyone, including women of color. For example,
intended parents order eggs or sperm off the internet through banks that stock genetic material
from “donors” with sought-after traits such as height, education, health, and markers of
whiteness such as skin color and hair texture. By stocking their shelves with much more genetic
material from white donors than from donors of color, they essentially retail whiteness.51
On the seller side of reproductive technology contracts, surrogate mothers and egg donors
usually have fewer resources than intended parents. Those power disparities take on international
dimensions when fertility tourists travel to countries such as India to cut costs and take
advantage of more lax regulatory environments.52
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Surrogacy contracts have attracted substantial criticism.53 Philosopher Elizabeth
Anderson contended that surrogacy treats children and women’s reproductive capacities as
commodities, what she regarded as an “unconscionable commodification.”54 Along the same
lines, Nancy Ehrenreich questions whether surrogates really exercise freedom of contract, since
they are often low-income women with children who need a job that does not require them to
leave their homes.55
Additional objections are that surrogacy contracts exploit women and collude with
eugenics in ways that harm gamete donors, surrogates, and, more generally, people of color,
women, people with disabilities, and the wider culture. As Anita Allen reminds us, legal rules
commodified enslaved African American women’s reproductive capacity by tracing children’s
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status as slave or free to their mothers.56 That single rule delivered a zero-sum bonanza to white
men at the expense of Black women by exponentially increasing white male economic, social,
and psychological power over African American women, men, and children.57 Khiara Bridges
tied this history to today’s surrogacy law and practices, noting that legalized surrogacy has the
potential to “magnify racial inequalities inasmuch as wealthy white people will look to poor
women of color to carry and give birth to the white babies that the couples covet.”58
Dorothy Roberts’s work in this vein may well be the most influential, in particular her
1997 book Killing the Black Body.59 Roberts tied that history to today’s reproductive technology
practices and regulation.60 Through this lens, (largely) white women’s freedom of contract to
hire surrogates matters less than continued reproductive race injustices such as involuntary
sterilization, mandatory birth control for public assistance recipients, incarcerated pregnant
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women being forced to give birth in shackles, and racial disparities in child-removal decisions.61
Roberts also flagged the dangers of discrimination against people with disabilities, exacerbated
by surrogacy.62
Finally, Naomi Cahn’s influential critiques of contractual views of parenthood focused on
the sale of gametes used in IVF and alternative insemination. Test Tube Families argued for
increased state regulation of families created through assisted reproduction such as surrogacy and
alternative insemination. She decried the current laissez-faire system in which would-be mothers
may purchase sperm from anonymous donors via sperm banks, expressing concern that this
practice denies children the right to know their origins. Cahn’s proposed solutions included
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sperm donor registries and “donor-conceived” stamps on birth certificates of children conceived
via contract instead of coitus.63

III.

Contracts as an Instrument of Transitional Justice

A third group of feminist legal theorists see the benefits and burdens of contract in a more
nuanced way.64 In Peggy Radin’s pragmatic formulation, which she called “incomplete
commodification,” contracts can provide some but not all of the regulation for a given
transaction. As such, they serve as a way station between “ideal justice” and “nonideal justice,”
helping law and society “transition from where we are to a better world.”65 An example of this
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approach is Adrienne Davis’s historical analysis of antebellum agreements to transfer property
between white men and Black women with whom they cohabited.66 While these concubinage
agreements were hardly paragons of an idealized contractualist relationship among equal
bargaining partners, they—and the law’s willingness to enforce a surprising number of them—
show that contract can provide a second-best solution when first-best is not an option.
In the family law context, Jana Singer is a leading proponent of the view that contract can
provide a private law transition point between a publicly ordered system of gender subordination
to a public law rule that more fairly allocates the benefits and burdens of family life.67 She
catalogued trends of increased privatization in the late twentieth century such as spouses’ ability
to contractually alter the state-supplied rules regarding property division and alimony, the shift to
no-fault divorce, and contracting for parenthood through private adoptions and reproductive
technology contracts. On the pro side, she noted that privatization of family law can facilitate
alternative ways to form families that respect people’s choice, autonomy, and diversity of family
forms more than the old status-based models. However, downsides for families include the
common tendency of marital and cohabitation contracts to deprive women of access to a
household’s economic assets, and the loss of shared values about the nature of families and what
society owes them. Rather than champion particular reforms, Singer voiced appreciation for
law’s progression from privately ordered domestic partnership to same-sex marriage, gradually
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“recogniz[ing] and affirm[ing] family relationships as both a haven for individual self-expression
and a vehicle for expressing our most cherished public values.”68 Along the same lines, Singer
and Jane Murphy’s 2015 book Divorced from Reality applies this framework to analyze contractbased reforms to dispute resolution such as collaborative lawyering, especially in parenting
disputes.69
Empirical evidence supports this balanced approach. Sociologists Rosana Hertz and
Margaret Nelson’s comprehensive data collection and analysis told a complex story about
positive, negative, and neutral ways that gamete markets shape relationships.70 Likewise,
sociologist, lawyer, and former family law practitioner Hillary Berk documented the actual terms
in surrogacy contracts and the social dynamics among intended parents, surrogates, egg donors,
and agencies. Her data set of 115 interviews with the parties, agency personnel, and lawyers
about their surrogacy arrangements showed that contractualized reproduction can be
simultaneously “empowering” and “oppressive” as reproductive labor is both commodified and
legitimized.71 This view acknowledges power imbalances while valuing contractual pregnancy’s
ability to provide surrogates with needed income and meaningful work.
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Recent articles on surrogacy accept its continued existence—and thus its contractual
framework—and focus on how to regulate it to empower women and broaden the range of
family creation while avoiding exploitation.72 For example, Rachel Rebouché mapped gaps
between actual surrogacy contracts and surrogacy legislation on topics such as prenatal behaviors
from alcohol consumption to manicures to who decides whether and when to terminate a
pregnancy. Contract law and family law, together, may strike a balance between the freedom of
choice and protecting against overreach when moneyed intended parents, agencies, and attorneys
control much of the transactions.73
Although most contract-focused feminist legal theory imports contractualism into family
law and related doctrines, some scholars instead transport feminist insights into traditional
contract doctrines.

IV. Feminist Improvements to Traditional Contract Doctrines
Feminist proposals to right wrongs in contract doctrine draw on cultural feminism’s centering of
relationships and connection to others. These scholars challenge contract law’s traditional
assumptions that people are self-interested rational actors intent on maximizing their own
welfare. Instead, they propose an alternative, relational contract theory, which presumes equality
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of the parties and recognizes that their intent reflects their commercial and personal
relationships.74 As Debora Threedy explained, relational contract theory shifts our focus from
“the things contracted for to the relationship between the contracting parties,” which allows
contract doctrine to better respond to different kinds of contracts and to differences among
contracting parties.75
Influential contributions in this literature address employment law; debtor-creditor
relationships; and the defenses of duress, misrepresentation, and unconscionability that apply to
any kind of contract.

A. Employment Law
Employment law evolved out of the common law rules governing households, which reflected
and enforced hierarchies of men over women, adults over children, and masters over servants.76
It involves a mix of contract and status, and as it has moved toward contractualization, feminists
have argued for a relational understanding of contractual intent. These proposals tend to advocate
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for worker protections, perhaps because women’s socioeconomic situation is more likely to put
them in the position of employee than employer.
For example, Emily Houh has shown how the duty of good faith and fair dealing that
exists in every contract could modify the general rule that workers are employed-at-will. Houh’s
approach would use this common law doctrine to protect employees from employers’
subordinating conduct based on race, gender, and other identity categories when statutes fail to
recognize those harms.77 Houh also proposed expanding the duty of good faith to police conduct
between employers and employees before a contract is formed. Traditionally, the duty of good
faith arises out of the contract itself, so it does not exist prior to contract formation. Houh
reasoned that employment law should start applying good faith duties in hiring and negotiation to
protect employees from discrimination in the preemployment stage. Other uses of common law
contract rules might provide protection for characteristics, such as obesity, or from harmful
conduct, such as bullying, which employment discrimination statutes do not (yet) cover.78 An
expansive interpretation of good faith could fill those gaps.
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Another example of feminist influence on employment contracts incorporates substantive
fairness to temper harsh noncompete agreements. Rachel Arnow-Richman would recognize the
relational components of employment by importing the family law requirement of substantive
fairness in marital contracts.79 She reasoned that because “noncompetes [and] premarital
agreements are an attempt to control in advance the financial consequences of the dissolution of
a legal relationship,” courts should evaluate their validity by the marital contracting tests
regarding “the quality of the spouse’s consent and the fairness of the agreement at the time it was
drafted.”80

B. Debtor-Creditor Relationships
Traditional contract doctrine erases identity categories by assuming away peoples’ gender, race,
and class, all in the name of formal equality. Granted, formal equality is an upgrade from the bad
old days of coverture and enslavement when the law deprived married women and enslaved
Americans of the power to enter contracts. Still, law’s supposed neutrality too often masks the
law taking the perspective of more powerful parties. In the debt context, that faux neutrality can
interfere with women’s access to capital—and thus life choices—and ignore or exacerbate
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gendered vulnerabilities to sexual assault and responsibility to care for children and other
dependents.
For example, Elizabeth Warren and others have long flagged the higher price of debt for
women.81 Two feminist proposals import relational contract insights to prevent creditors from
taking advantage of debtors’ gendered vulnerability.
Spousal surety cases—in which wives personally guarantee their spouses’ business
debts—provide fertile ground to plant feminist insights.82 Gillian Hadfield used spousal surety
agreements as a platform to propose a reliance-based, relational theory of contract that she called
an “expressive theory of contract.”83 Spousal-guarantee cases have outsized effects on the lives
of women and their families because the surety agreement allows a bank to sell the family home
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to collect a loan that it extended to cover a husband’s business debts. That outcome is
particularly unjust when the husband has misinformed the wife about the amount of the debt, a
religious wife faces lifelong pressure to “accept a position of subservience and obedience to her
husband,” or the wife signed under duress.84
Because these circumstances raise serious questions about the genuineness of wives’
consent, English courts have presumed undue influence or misrepresentation in cases where the
surety and debtor are spouses or cohabitants. However, creditors can rebut this presumption by
establishing that the surety fully understood the nature and consequences of the transaction:
namely, that she could lose her home. Consequently, British lenders give special notice to each
wife/surety of the amount of her potential liability and its risks, and also advise her to get
independent legal advice. U.S. courts, in contrast, generally let spousal sureties defeat creditors’
claims only if they can show that the creditor knew of or participated in the husband’s duress,
misrepresentation, undue influence, or fraud.85
Hadfield proposed a third path. She critiqued notice as insufficient to transform a surety
under gendered constraints into a rational self-interest maximizer. Instead, she contended,
contract law should balance gendered constraints against the danger of paternalist assumptions
that women are unable to think for themselves. In Hadfield’s view, the dominant contractarian
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“will” theory of contract should remain the rule for commercial contracts but be supplemented
with a relational or reliance-based theory of contract in special cases such as spousal guarantees,
surrogacy, and marital separation agreements.86
Another commercial context in which legal scholars have sought to import feminism to
better balance debtor-creditor relations arises out of a statute, UCC article 9. Article 9 governs
secured transactions, in which debtors give creditors a “security interest” in collateral so that
when a debtor defaults by, for example, failing to pay down the loan, the creditor can repossess
the collateral to satisfy the debt.87 The most remarkable thing about article 9 is that creditors’
repossession rights are entirely private; courts are not involved. Upon a debtor’s default, a
secured creditor can hire a private repo person to seize collateral and sell it at a private sale to
satisfy the debt. Car loans are such a common—and familiar—instance of article 9’s application
that an entire genre of TV shows features those repossessions.88
Jean Braucher and Debora Threedy have both proposed that the article 9 standards for
what repo people can and cannot do consider the perspective of female debtors. For example,
Jean Braucher proposed a “repo code” that would supplement the current standard that
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repossessions cannot “breach the peace” with a set of more specific rules.89 Following the federal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Braucher’s repo code would prevent creditors from taking
advantage of female debtors’ fear of sexual assault and desire to protect their children by, for
example, prohibiting: middle-of-the-night repossession at a debtor’s home; entering a residence
or garage of commercial building without contemporaneous permission; and “breaking, opening,
or removing any lock gate, or other barrier.”90
Where Jean Braucher’s “repo code” implicitly protects the expectations of female
debtors, Debora Threedy argued for something more like a “reasonable woman” standard in
judging whether a repossession violated article 9.91 According to this view, the traditional
standard that a threat of violence impermissibly breaches the peace is not enough. Instead,
Threedy contended, judges deciding article 9 cases should acknowledge that the mere fact of
men showing up in the middle of the night could constitute a threat of violence. For example,
one case involved a mother living with her two young children in a trailer home. Repo men woke
her up at 4:30 A.M. to repossess her car.92 She told them to stop and insisted that she needed to
get personal items out of the car, yet the two repo men refused to comply and asserted their
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control by stepping between her and the car. Although UCC article 9 formally says that
repossession over debtor objection breaches the peace, the court concluded that the facts did not
constitute an impermissible threat of force or risk of violence.93 Threedy, in contrast, asserted
that “perhaps standing in her nightclothes before two strangers in the middle of a winter night,
with her two small children alone in the trailer, was intimidation enough.”94

C. Defenses
Scholars such as Threedy have also examined how feminist interpretations of common law
defenses of duress and misrepresentation could help contract law reflect the perspectives of
women who assert them, instead of the people and institutions against whom they are asserted.
Threedy grounded her approach in relational contract theory, urging us to question contract law’s
preferences for “objectivity over subjectivity [and] for abstraction over contextualization.”95 One
influential application of this view is Threedy’s archaeological excavation of the canonical
contract case Vokes v. Arthur Murray, in which the plaintiff claimed she was induced on false
premises to enter into expensive contracts with a dancing school that misrepresented her dancing
ability.96 Threedy noted the tension between autonomy and fairness that runs throughout contract
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law and suggested Hadfield’s expressive choice theory of contract could better justify Audrey
Vokes being able to avoid the monumental bill racked up by the dance studio via its
misrepresentations.97

Conclusion
Contract plays a prominent role in feminist legal theory. Contract has played a crucial role in
overturning systemic structures of subordination such as coverture and the exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage. However, the presumptions of market access and equal bargaining power
ignore or downplay systemic hierarchies of race, class, and gender in ways that can render
contracts unsuitable to achieve foundational feminist goals. Perhaps the most nuanced view of
contract within feminist legal theory situates it as a private law mechanism for law to transition
from outdated public status-based rules to new public rules that more justly distribute resources.
Just as some feminists have used contract to improve family law, others have transported
feminist insights to improve defects in traditional contract law. Often grounded in relational
contract theory, these proposals would expand the duty of good faith in employment law,
recognize gendered power differences in debtor-creditor relations, and reconstruct equitable
defenses such as duress that apply in all contractual contexts. Although feminism has yet to
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radically reshape contract doctrine, feminist scholars’ deep engagement with contract law has
opened new possibilities for future developments in the law.
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